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Summary 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994. The 
agreement was signed by President George H. W. Bush on December 17, 1992, and approved by 
Congress on November 20, 1993. The NAFTA Implementation Act was signed into law by 
President William J. Clinton on December 8, 1993 (P.L. 103-182). The overall economic impact 
of NAFTA is difficult to measure since trade and investment trends are influenced by numerous 
other economic variables, such as economic growth, inflation, and currency fluctuations. The 
agreement likely accelerated and also locked in trade liberalization that was already taking place 
in Mexico, but many of these changes may have taken place without an agreement. Nevertheless, 
NAFTA is significant, because it was the most comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) 
negotiated at the time and contained several groundbreaking provisions. A legacy of the 
agreement is that it has served as a template or model for the new generation of FTAs that the 
United States later negotiated, and it also served as a template for certain provisions in 
multilateral trade negotiations as part of the Uruguay Round. 
The 115th Congress faces numerous issues related to NAFTA and international trade. On May 18, 
2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks 
with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA). The administration also began consulting with Members of Congress on the 
scope of the negotiations. Alternatively President Trump, at times, has threatened to withdraw 
from the agreement without satisfactory results. Congress may wish to consider the ramifications 
of renegotiating or withdrawing from NAFTA and how it may affect the U.S. economy and 
foreign relations with Mexico and Canada. It may also wish to examine the congressional role in 
a possible renegotiation, as well as the negotiating positions of Canada and Mexico. Mexico has 
stated that, if NAFTA is reopened, it may seek to broaden negotiations to include security, 
counter-narcotics, and transmigration issues. Mexico has also indicated that it may choose to 
withdraw from the agreement if the negotiations are not favorable to the country. Congress may 
also wish to address issues related to the U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, Mexico, and 9 other 
countries. Some observers contend that the withdrawal from TPP could damage U.S. 
competitiveness and economic leadership in the region, while others see the withdrawal as a way 
to prevent lower cost imports and potential job losses. Key provisions in TPP may also be 
addressed in “modernizing” or renegotiating NAFTA, a more than two decade-old FTA.  
NAFTA was controversial when first proposed, mostly because it was the first FTA involving two 
wealthy, developed countries and a developing country. The political debate surrounding the 
agreement was divisive with proponents arguing that the agreement would help generate 
thousands of jobs and reduce income disparity in the region, while opponents warned that the 
agreement would cause huge job losses in the United States as companies moved production to 
Mexico to lower costs. In reality, NAFTA did not cause the huge job losses feared by the critics or 
the large economic gains predicted by supporters. The net overall effect of NAFTA on the U.S. 
economy appears to have been relatively modest, primarily because trade with Canada and 
Mexico accounts for a small percentage of U.S. GDP. However, there were worker and firm 
adjustment costs as the three countries adjusted to more open trade and investment.  
The rising number of bilateral and regional trade agreements throughout the world and the rising 
presence of China in Latin America could have implications for U.S. trade policy with its NAFTA 
partners. Some proponents of open and rules-based trade contend that maintaining NAFTA or 
deepening economic relations with Canada and Mexico will help promote a common trade 
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agenda with shared values and generate economic growth. Some opponents argue that the 
agreement has caused worker displacement, and renegotiation could cause further job losses. 
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Introduction 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been in effect since January 1, 1994. 
NAFTA was signed by President George H. W. Bush on December 17, 1992, and approved by 
Congress on November 20, 1993. The NAFTA Implementation Act was signed into law by 
President William J. Clinton on December 8, 1993 (P.L. 103-182). NAFTA continues to be of 
interest to Congress because of the importance of Canada and Mexico as trading partners, and 
because of the implications NAFTA has for U.S. trade policy under the Administration of 
President Donald J. Trump. During his election campaign, President Trump stated his desire to 
renegotiate NAFTA and that he would examine the ramifications of withdrawing from the 
agreement once he entered into office. He has also raised the possibility of imposing tariffs or a 
border tax on products from Mexico. This report provides an overview of North American 
market-opening provisions prior to NAFTA, provisions of the agreement, economic effects, and 
policy considerations.  
On May 18, 2017, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) sent the 90-day notification to Congress 
of its intent to begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate the NAFTA, as required by the 
2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) (P.L. 114-26). Some trade issues that Congress may 
address in regard to NAFTA, and the prospective renegotiation of the agreement, include the 
economic effects of withdrawing from the agreement, the impact on relations with Canada and 
Mexico, the demands that Canada and Mexico may bring to the negotiations, and an evaluation of 
how to “modernize” or renegotiate NAFTA. Another issue relates to the consequences of the U.S. 
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed free trade agreement among the 
United States and 11 other countries, including Canada and Mexico. Some TPP participants 
support moving forward on a similar agreement without the participation of the United States, 
which may have implications for U.S. competitiveness in certain markets.1 It also has 
implications for NAFTA renegotiation as it addressed several new issues not in NAFTA. 
Some trade policy experts and economists give credit to NAFTA and other free trade agreements 
(FTAs) for expanding trade and economic linkages between countries, creating more efficient 
production processes, increasing the availability of lower-priced consumer goods, and improving 
living standards and working conditions. Others blame FTAs for disappointing employment 
trends, a decline in U.S. wages, and for not having done enough to improve labor standards and 
environmental conditions abroad. 
NAFTA influenced other FTAs that the United States later negotiated and also influenced 
multilateral negotiations. NAFTA initiated a new generation of trade agreements in the Western 
Hemisphere and other parts of the world, influencing negotiations in areas such as market access, 
rules of origin, intellectual property rights, foreign investment, dispute resolution, worker rights, 
and environmental protection. The United States currently has 14 FTAs with 20 countries. As 
with NAFTA, these trade agreements have often been supported or criticized on similar 
arguments related to jobs.  
Market Opening Prior to NAFTA 
The concept of economic integration in North America was not a new one at the time NAFTA 
negotiations started. In 1911, President William Howard Taft signed a reciprocal trade agreement 
                                                 
1 See CRS Report R44489, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress, coordinated 
by Ian F. Fergusson and Brock R. Williams. 
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with Canadian Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier. After a bitter election, Canadians rejected free 
trade and ousted Prime Minister Laurier, thereby ending the agreement. In 1965, the United States 
and Canada signed the U.S.-Canada Automotive Products Agreement that liberalized trade in 
cars, trucks, tires, and automotive parts between the two countries.2 The Auto Pact was credited as 
a pioneer in creating an integrated North American automotive sector. In the case of Mexico, the 
government began implementing reform measures in the mid-1980s, prior to NAFTA, to 
liberalize its economy. By 1990, when NAFTA negotiations began, Mexico had already taken 
significant steps towards liberalizing its protectionist trade regime.  
The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1989 
The United States and Canada signed a bilateral free trade agreement (CFTA) on October 3, 1987. 
The FTA was the first economically significant bilateral FTA signed by the United States.3 
Implementing legislation4 was approved by both houses of Congress under “fast-track 
authority”—now known as trade promotion authority (TPA)—and signed by President Ronald 
Reagan on September 28, 1988. While the FTA generated significant policy debate in the United 
States, it was a watershed moment for Canada. Controversy surrounding the proposed FTA led to 
the so-called “free trade election” in 1988, in which sitting Progressive Conservative Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney, who negotiated the agreement, defeated Liberal party leader John 
Turner, who vowed to reject it if elected. After the election, the FTA was passed by Parliament in 
December 1988, and it came into effect between the two nations on January 1, 1989. At the time, 
it probably was the most comprehensive bilateral FTA negotiated worldwide and contained 
several groundbreaking provisions. The agreement 
 Eliminated all tariffs by 1998. Many were eliminated immediately, and the 
remaining tariffs were phased out in 5-10 years. 
 Continued the 1965 U.S.-Canada Auto Pact, but tightened its rules of origin. 
Some Canadian auto sector practices not covered by the Auto Pact were ended by 
1998. 
 Provided national treatment for covered services providers and liberalized 
financial services trade. Facilitated cross-border travel for business professionals. 
 Committed to provide prospective national treatment for investment originating 
in the other countries, although established derogations from national treatment, 
such as for national security or prudential reasons, were allowed to continue.  
 Banned imposition of performance requirements, such as local content, import 
substitution, or local sourcing requirements. 
 Expanded the size of federal government procurement markets available for 
competitive bidding from suppliers of the other country. It did not include sub-
federal government procurement. 
 Provided for a binding binational panel to resolve disputes arising from the 
agreement (a Canadian insistence). 
                                                 
2 The Canada-United States Automotive Products Agreement removed tariffs on cars, trucks, buses, tires, and 
automotive parts between the two countries. NAFTA effectively superseded this agreement. 
3 Prior to the U.S.-Canada FTA, the only bilateral U.S. FTA was with Israel. 
4 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-449).  
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 Prohibited most import and export restrictions on energy products, including 
minimum export prices. This was carried forth in NAFTA only with regard to 
Canada-U.S. energy trade. 
Many of these provisions were incorporated into, or expanded in, NAFTA. However, the FTA did 
not include, or specifically exempted, some issues that would appear in NAFTA for the first time. 
These include  
 Intellectual property rights (IPR). The FTA did not contain language on 
intellectual property rights. NAFTA was the first FTA to include meaningful 
disciplines on IPR. 
 Cultural exemption. It exempted the broadcasting, film, and publishing sectors. 
This exemption continues in NAFTA, due to Canadian concerns. 
 Transportation services and investment in the Canadian energy sector were 
excluded from the FTA. These exclusions were limited in NAFTA. 
 Trade remedies. Neither the FTA nor NAFTA ended the use of trade remedy 
actions (anti-dumping, countervailing duty, or safeguards) against the other. This 
was a key Canadian goal of the FTA. NAFTA did create a separate dispute 
settlement mechanism to review national decisions on trade remedy decisions, 
but this mechanism has not been replicated in other FTAs. 
 Softwood lumber. The FTA grandfathered in the then-present 1986 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) governing softwood lumber trade. 
However, it did not permanently settle the softwood lumber issue. Since then, the 
MOU has been replaced by other agreements, and, at times, by resort to trade 
remedy actions. 
 Agricultural supply management. Canada was able to exempt its agriculture 
supply management system, although it committed to allow a small increase in 
imports of dairy, poultry, and eggs, which carried over into the NAFTA. 
Mexico’s Pre-NAFTA Unilateral Trade Liberalization 
Well before NAFTA negotiations began, Mexico was liberalizing its protectionist trade and 
investment policies that had been in place for decades (see page 9 of this report). The restrictive 
trade regime began after Mexico’s revolutionary period and remained until the early- to mid-
1980s when the country was facing a debt crisis. It was at this time that the government took 
unilateral steps to open and modernize its economy by relaxing investment policies and 
liberalizing trade barriers. The trade liberalization measures that began in the mid-1980s shifted 
Mexico from one of the world’s most protected economies into one of the most open. Mexico 
now has 12 FTAs involving 46 countries.5 
Mexico’s first steps in opening its closed economy focused on reforming its import substitution 
policies in the mid-1980s. Further reforms were made in 1986 when Mexico became a member of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As a condition of becoming a GATT 
member, for example, Mexico agreed to lower its maximum tariff rates to 50%. Mexico went 
                                                 
5 Mexican Government’s Ministry of Economy, “International Trade/Countries with Treaties and Agreements Signed 
with Mexico,” available at http://www.gob.mx/se/acciones-y-programas/comercio-exterior-paises-con-tratados-y-
acuerdos-firmados-con-mexico. For more information, see CRS Report R40784, Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements, by 
M. Angeles Villarreal.  
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further by reducing its highest tariff rate from 100% to 20%. Mexico’s trade-weighted average 
tariff fell from 25% in 1985 to about 19% in 1989.6 
Although Mexico had been lowering trade and investment restrictions since 1986, the number of 
remaining barriers for U.S. exports remained high at the time of the NAFTA negotiations. Mexico 
required import licenses on 230 products from the United States, affecting about 7% of the value 
of U.S. exports to Mexico. Prior to its entry into GATT, Mexico required import licenses on all 
imports. At the time of the NAFTA negotiations, about 60% of U.S. agricultural exports to 
Mexico required import licenses. Mexico also had numerous other nontariff barriers, such as 
“official import prices,” an arbitrary customs valuation system that raised duty assessments.7 
For Mexico, an FTA with the United States represented a way to lock in the reforms of its market 
opening measures from the mid-1980s to transform Mexico’s formerly statist economy after the 
devastating debt crisis of the 1980s.8 The combination of the severe economic impact of the debt 
crisis, low domestic savings, and an increasingly overvalued peso put pressure on the Mexican 
government to adopt market-opening economic reforms and boost imports of goods and capital to 
encourage more competition in the Mexican market. An FTA with the United States was a way of 
blocking domestic efforts to roll back Mexican reforms, especially in the politically sensitive 
agriculture sector. NAFTA helped deflect protectionist demands of industrial groups and special 
interest groups in Mexico.9 One of the main goals of the Mexican government was to increase 
investment confidence in order to attract greater flows of foreign investment and spur economic 
growth. Since the entry into force of NAFTA, Mexico has used the agreement as a basic model 
for other FTAs Mexico has signed with other countries.10 
For the United States, NAFTA represented an opportunity to expand the growing export market to 
the south, but it also represented a political opportunity for the United States and Mexico to work 
together in resolving some of the tensions in the bilateral relationship.11 An FTA with Mexico 
would help U.S. businesses expand exports to a growing market of 100 million people. U.S. 
officials also recognized that imports from Mexico would likely include higher U.S. content than 
imports from Asian countries. In addition to the trade and investment opportunities that NAFTA 
represented, an agreement with Mexico would be a way to support the growth of political 
pluralism and a deepening of democratic processes in Mexico. NAFTA also presented an 
opportunity for the United States to spur the slow progress on the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations.12  
                                                 
6 United States International Trade Commission (USITC), The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free Trade 
Agreement with Mexico, Publication 2353, February 1991. 
7 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
8 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges, Institute for 
International Economics, October 2005.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Mexico has a total of 12 free trade agreements involving 46 countries. These include agreements with most countries 
in the Western Hemisphere including the United States, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. In addition, Mexico has negotiated FTAs outside of the Western 
Hemisphere and entered into agreements with Israel, Japan, the European Union, and the European Free Trade 
Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). 
11 Hufbauer and Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges, pp. 2-3. 
12 Ibid. 
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Overview of NAFTA Provisions 
At the time that NAFTA was implemented, the U.S.-Canada FTA was already in effect and U.S. 
tariffs on most Mexican goods were low, while Mexico had the highest protective trade barriers. 
Under the agreement, the United States and Canada gained greater access to the Mexican market, 
which was the fastest growing major export market for U.S. goods and services at the time.13 
NAFTA also opened up the U.S. market to increased imports from Mexico and Canada, creating 
one of the largest single markets in the world. Some of the key NAFTA provisions included tariff 
and non-tariff trade liberalization, rules of origin, services trade, foreign investment, intellectual 
property rights protection, government procurement, and dispute resolution. Labor and 
environmental provisions were included in separate NAFTA side agreements.  
Removal of Trade Barriers 
The market opening provisions of the agreement gradually eliminated all tariffs and most non-
tariff barriers on goods produced and traded within North America over a period of 15 years after 
it entered into force. Some tariffs were eliminated immediately, while others were phased out in 
various schedules of 5 to 15 years. Most tariffs were phased out within 10 years. U.S. import-
sensitive sectors, such as glassware, footwear, and ceramic tile, received longer phase-out 
schedules.14 NAFTA provided the option of accelerating tariff reductions if the countries involved 
agreed.15 The agreement included safeguard provisions in which the importing country could 
increase tariffs, or impose quotas in some cases, on imports during a transition period if domestic 
producers faced serious injury as a result of increased imports from another NAFTA country. It 
terminated all existing drawback programs by January 1, 2001.16 
Tariff Changes 
Most of the market opening measures from NAFTA resulted in the removal of tariffs and quotas 
applied by Mexico on imports from the United States and Canada. Because Mexican tariffs were 
substantially higher than those of the United States, it was expected that the agreement would 
cause U.S. exports to expand more quickly than imports from Mexico. The average applied U.S. 
duty for all imports from Mexico was 2.07% in 1993.17 Moreover, many Mexican products 
entered the United States duty-free under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In 
1993, over 50% of U.S. imports from Mexico entered the United States duty-free. In contrast, the 
United States faced considerably higher tariffs, in addition to substantial non-tariff barriers, on 
exports to Mexico. In 1993, Mexico’s average tariffs on all imports from the United States was 
10% (Canada’s was 0.37%).18 In agriculture, Mexico’s trade-weighted tariff on U.S. products 
                                                 
13 United States International Trade Commission, Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of the 
North American Free-Trade Agreement, USITC Publication 2596, January 1993. 
14 Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United States of America, Description of the Proposed 
North American Free Trade Agreement, August 12, 1992. 
15 Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1993, pp. 171-175, 180-181. 
16 A duty drawback is the refund or waiver in whole or in part of customs duties assessed or collected upon importation 
of an article or materials which are subsequently exported. 
17 Executive Office of the President, Study on the Operation and Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
July 1997, pp. 6-7. 
18 Ibid. 
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averaged about 11%. Also affecting U.S.-Mexico trade were both countries’ sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) rules, Mexican import licensing requirements, and U.S. marketing orders.19  
Figure 1. Average Applied Tariff Levels in Mexico and the United States 
(1993 and 1996) 
 
Source: Executive Office of the President, Study on the Operation and Effects of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, July 1997, p. 7. 
Trade Barrier Removal by Industry 
Some of the more significant changes took place in the textiles, apparel, automotive, and 
agricultural industries. Elimination of trade barriers in these key industries are summarized below. 
 Textiles and Apparel Industries. NAFTA phased out all duties on textile and 
apparel goods within North America meeting specific NAFTA rules of origin20 
over a 10-year period. Prior to NAFTA, 65% of U.S. apparel imports from 
Mexico entered duty-free and quota-free, and the remaining 35% faced an 
average tariff rate of 17.9%. Mexico’s average tariff on U.S. textile and apparel 
products was 16%, with duties as high as 20% on some products.21 
 Automotive Industry. NAFTA phased out Mexico’s restrictive auto decree. It 
phased out all U.S. tariffs on imports from Mexico and Mexican tariffs on U.S. 
and Canadian products as long as they met the rules of origin requirements of 
62.5% North American content for autos, light trucks, engines and transmissions; 
                                                 
19 Marketing orders were designed to set national guidelines for product quality, market promotion, and supply levels. 
The most significant Mexican products that were affected by U.S. marketing orders included tomatoes, onions, 
avocados, grapefruit, oranges, olives, and table grapes. 
20 NAFTA rules of origin for textiles and apparel define when imported textile or apparel goods qualify for preferential 
treatments. For most products, the rule of origin is “yarn forward”, which means that goods must be produced from 
yarn made in a NAFTA country to benefit from preferential treatment.  
21 Business Roundtable, NAFTA: A Decade of Growth, Prepared by The Trade Partnership, Washington, DC, February 
2004, p. 33. 
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and 60% for other vehicles and automotive parts. Some tariffs were eliminated 
immediately, while others were phased out in periods of 5 to 10 years. Prior to 
NAFTA, the United States assessed the following tariffs on imports from 
Mexico: 2.5% on automobiles, 25% on light-duty trucks, and a trade-weighted 
average of 3.1% for automotive parts. Mexican tariffs on U.S. and Canadian 
automotive products were as follows: 20% on automobiles and light trucks, and 
10%-20% on auto parts.22 
 Agriculture. NAFTA set out separate bilateral undertakings on cross-border 
trade in agriculture, one between Canada and Mexico, and the other between 
Mexico and the United States. As a general matter, U.S.-Canada FTA provisions 
continued to apply on trade with Canada.23 Regarding U.S.-Mexico agriculture 
trade, NAFTA eliminated most non-tariff barriers in agricultural trade, either 
through their conversion to tariff-rate quotas (TRQs)24 or ordinary tariffs. Tariffs 
were phased out over a period of 15 years with sensitive products such as sugar 
and corn receiving the longest phase-out periods. Approximately one-half of 
U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade became duty-free when the agreement went into 
effect. Prior to NAFTA, most tariffs, on average, in agricultural trade between the 
United States and Mexico were fairly low though some U.S. exports to Mexico 
faced tariffs as high as 12%. However, approximately one-fourth of U.S. 
agricultural exports to Mexico (by value) were subjected to restrictive import 
licensing requirements.25  
Services Trade Liberalization 
NAFTA services provisions established a set of basic rules and obligations in services trade 
among partner countries. The agreement expanded on provisions in the U.S.-Canada FTA and in 
the then-negotiation in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations to create 
internationally agreed disciplines on government regulation of trade in services.26 The agreement 
granted services providers certain rights concerning nondiscriminatory treatment, cross-border 
sales and entry, investment, and access to information. However, there were certain exclusions 
and reservations by each country. These included maritime shipping (United States), film and 
publishing (Canada), and oil and gas drilling (Mexico).27 Although NAFTA liberalized certain 
service sectors in Mexico, particularly financial services, which profoundly altered its banking 
sector, other sectors were barely affected.28 In telecommunications services, NAFTA partners 
agreed to exclude provision of, but not the use of, basic telecommunications services. NAFTA 
granted a “bill of rights” for the providers and users of telecommunications services, including 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 30. 
23 Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United States of America, Description of the Proposed 
North American Free Trade Agreement, August 12, 1992, p. 12. 
24 Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) allowed NAFTA partners to export specified quantities of a product to other NAFTA 
countries at a relatively low tariff, but subjected all imports of the product above a pre-determined threshold to a higher 
tariff. 
25 Business Roundtable, NAFTA: A Decade of Growth, p. 35. 
26 The Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United States of America, Description of the 
Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement, August 12, 1992, pp. 23-24. 
27 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), “North American Free Trade Agreement: Assessment of Major 
Issues, Volume 2,” Report to the Congress, September 1993, pp. 35-36.  
28 Hufbauer and Schott, NAFTA Revisited, pp. 25-29. 
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access to public telecommunications services; connection to private lines that reflect economic 
costs and available on a flat-rate pricing basis; and the right to choose, purchase, or lease terminal 
equipment best suited to their needs.29 However, NAFTA did not require parties to authorize a 
person of another NAFTA country to provide or operate telecommunications transport networks 
or services. NAFTA did not bar a party from maintaining a monopoly provider of public networks 
or services, such as Telmex, Mexico’s dominant telecommunications company.30 
Other Provisions 
In addition to market opening measures through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
NAFTA incorporated numerous other provisions to establish rules or achieve greater market 
access on foreign investment, intellectual property rights (IPR), dispute resolution, and 
government procurement.  
 Foreign Investment. NAFTA removed significant investment barriers, ensured 
basic protections for NAFTA investors, and provided a mechanism for the 
settlement of disputes between investors and a NAFTA country. NAFTA 
provided for “non-discriminatory treatment” for foreign investment by NAFTA 
parties in certain sectors of other NAFTA countries. The agreement included 
country-specific liberalization commitments and exceptions to national treatment. 
Exemptions from NAFTA investment provisions included the energy sector in 
Mexico, in which the Mexican government reserved the right to prohibit foreign 
investment. It also included exceptions related to national security and to 
Canada’s cultural industries.31 
 IPR. NAFTA built upon the then-ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations that 
would create the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement in the World Trade Organization and on various existing international 
intellectual property treaties. The agreement set out specific enforceable 
commitments by NAFTA parties regarding the protection of copyrights, patents, 
trademarks, and trade secrets, among other provisions.  
 Dispute Settlement Procedures. NAFTA’s provisions for preventing and settling 
disputes were built upon provisions in the U.S.-Canada FTA. NAFTA created a 
system of arbitration for resolving disputes that included initial consultations, 
taking the issue to the NAFTA Trade Commission, or going through arbitral 
panel proceedings.32 NAFTA included separate dispute settlement provisions for 
addressing disputes over antidumping and countervailing duty determinations.  
 Government Procurement. NAFTA opened up a significant portion of federal 
government procurement in each country on a nondiscriminatory basis to 
suppliers from other NAFTA countries for goods and services. It contains some 
limitations for procurement by state-owned enterprises.33   
                                                 
29 GAO, Report to Congress, September 1993, pp. 38-39. 
30 Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement, August 12, 1992, p. 29. 
31 Ibid., pp. 30-32.  
32 If the parties are unable to resolve the issue through consultations, they may take the dispute to the NAFTA Trade 
Commission, which is comprised of Ministers or cabinet-level officers designated by each country. A party may also 
request the establishment of an arbitral panel, which may make recommendations for the resolution of the dispute. 
33 GAO, Report to Congress, September 1993, pp. 69-71. 
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Mexico’s Protectionist Trade/Investment Policies 
Prior to NAFTA 
For decades prior to NAFTA, Mexico relied on protectionist trade and investment policies that were intended to 
help foster domestic growth and to protect itself from a perceived risk of foreign domination, but that failed to 
achieve the intended outcomes. 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Strong state presence prior to NAFTA. During the late 1950s and 1960s, the 
number of state-owned enterprises almost doubled. By 1982, the number of SOEs had grown to more than 1,000. 
Starting in 1983, economic reforms and divestiture of the state-owned sector significantly decreased the number of 
SOEs (down to 210 by 2003). 
Import Licenses. In the early 1980s, import licenses were required on most, if not all, imports. In the mid-1980s, 
the government began to phase these out. By the time NAFTA negotiations started, import licenses were required on 
only 230 products of the nearly 12,000 items in the Mexican tariff schedule.  
Agricultural Products. Prior to NAFTA, 60% of U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico required import licenses or 
faced other nontariff barriers. There was also a lack of transparency of procedures through which exporters to 
Mexico could apply for the proper license, certificate, or test. 
Foreign Investment Restrictions. Mexico’s restrictive Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign 
Investment restricted U.S. investment in Mexico. In 1991, about a third of Mexican economic activity was not open to 
majority foreign ownership. 
Auto Industry Import Substitution Policy (Auto Decrees). Mexico had a restrictive import substitution policy 
that began in the 1960s through a series of Mexican Auto Decrees in which the government sought to supply the 
entire Mexican market through domestically-produced automotive goods. The decrees established high import tariffs 
and had high restrictions on auto production by foreign companies.  
Restrictions in Agricultural Production. In the period after the 1910 revolution and until the 1980s, Mexico had 
a land distribution system in which land was redistributed from wealthy land owners and managed by the government. 
This ejido system, formed under Mexico’s Agrarian Law, changed in the 1980s when the government began to 
implement agricultural and trade policy reform measures. Changes included the privatization of the ejido system in 
order to stimulate competition. Mexico’s unilateral reform measures included eliminating state enterprises related to 
agriculture and removing staple price supports and subsidies. Mexico also had a government agency known as 
CONASUPO which intervened in the agriculture sector. The agency bought staples from farmers at guaranteed 
prices and processed the products or sold them at low prices to processors and consumers. Many of Mexico’s 
domestic reforms in agriculture coincided with NAFTA negotiations, beginning in 1991, and continued beyond the 
implementation of NAFTA in 1994. The unilateral reforms in the agricultural sector make it difficult to separate those 
effects from the effects of NAFTA. By 1999, CONASUPO had been abolished.  
Sources: United States International Trade Commission (USITC), The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free 
Trade Agreement with Mexico, Publication 2353, February 1991.Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, Institute for 
International Economics, NAFTA Revisited, October 2005. Alberto Chong and Florencio López-de-Silanes, Privatization 
in Mexico, Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper #513, August 2004. 
NAFTA Side Agreements on Labor and the Environment 
The NAFTA text did not include labor or environmental provisions, which was a major concern 
to many in Congress at the time of the agreement’s consideration. Some policymakers called for 
additional provisions to address numerous concerns about labor and environmental issues, 
specifically in Mexico. Other policymakers argued that the economic growth generated by the 
FTA would increase Mexico’s resources available for environmental and worker rights protection. 
However, congressional concerns from policymakers, as well as criticisms from labor and 
environmental groups, remained strong. 
Shortly after he began his presidency, President Clinton addressed labor and environmental issues 
by joining his counterparts in Canada and Mexico in negotiating formal side agreements. The 
NAFTA implementing legislation included provisions on the side agreements, authorizing U.S. 
participation in NAFTA labor and environmental commissions and appropriations for these 
activities. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) and the North 
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American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) entered into force on January 1, 
1994, the same day as NAFTA.34 NAFTA implementing legislation also included two adjustment 
assistance programs, designed to ease trade-related labor and firm adjustment pressures: the 
NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA-TAA) Program and the U.S. Community 
Adjustment and Investment Program (USCAIP).  
The labor and environmental side agreements included language to promote cooperation on labor 
and environmental matters as well as provisions to address a party’s failure to enforce its own 
labor and environmental laws. Perhaps most notable were the side agreements’ dispute settlement 
processes that, as a last resort, may impose monetary assessments and sanctions to address a 
party’s failure to enforce its laws.35 NAFTA marked the first time that labor and environmental 
provisions were associated with an FTA. For many, it represented an opportunity for cooperating 
on environmental and labor matters across borders and for establishing a new type of relationship 
among NAFTA partners.36  
In addition to the two trilateral side agreements, the United States and Mexico entered into a 
bilateral side agreement to NAFTA on border environmental cooperation.37 In this agreement, the 
two governments committed to cooperate on developing environmental infrastructure projects 
along the U.S.-Mexico border to address problems regarding the degradation of the environment 
due to increased economic activity. The agreement established two organizations to work on these 
issues: the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), located in Juárez, Mexico, 
and the North American Development Bank (NADBank), located in San Antonio, Texas. The 
sister organizations work closely together and with other partners at the federal, state and local 
level in the United States and Mexico to develop, certify, and facilitate financing for water and 
wastewater treatment, municipal solid waste disposal, and related projects on both sides of the 
U.S.-Mexico border region. These projects have provided border residents with more access to 
drinking water, sewer and wastewater treatment. In December 2014, the Board of NADBank and 
BECC approved a merger of the two organizations, which has not been completed as of the date 
of this report.38 
Trade Trends and Economic Effects 
Most economists contend that trade liberalization promotes overall economic growth and 
efficiency among trading partners, although there are short-term adjustment costs. NAFTA was 
unusual in global terms because it was the first time that an FTA linked two wealthy, developed 
countries with a low-income developing country. For this reason, the agreement received 
considerable attention by U.S. policymakers, manufacturers, service providers, agriculture 
producers, labor unions, non-government organizations, and academics. Proponents argued that 
the agreement would help generate thousands of jobs and reduce income disparity between 
                                                 
34 The USCAIP, administered by the North American Development Bank, provides financial assistance to communities 
with significant job losses due to changes in trade patterns with Mexico or Canada as a result of NAFTA. 
35 For more information, see CRS Report RS22823, Overview of Labor Enforcement Issues in Free Trade Agreements, 
by Mary Jane Bolle, and CRS Report 97-291, NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives, by Mary 
Tiemann. 
36 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, NAFTA at 10: Progress, Potential, and Precedents, pp. 20-30.  
37 The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican 
States Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American 
Development Bank, November 1993.  
38 CRS In Focus IF10480, The North American Development Bank, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss.  
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Mexico and its northern neighbors. Opponents warned that the agreement would create huge job 
losses in the United States as companies moved production to Mexico to lower costs.39  
Estimating the economic impact of trade agreements is a daunting task due to a lack of data and 
important theoretical and practical matters associated with generating results from economic 
models. In addition, such estimates provide an incomplete accounting of the total economic 
effects of trade agreements.40 Numerous studies suggest that NAFTA achieved many of the 
intended trade and economic benefits.41 Other studies suggest that NAFTA has come at some cost 
to U.S. workers.42 This has been in keeping with what most economists maintain, that trade 
liberalization promotes overall economic growth among trading partners, but that there are both 
winners and losers from adjustments.  
Not all changes in trade and investment patterns within North America since 1994 can be 
attributed to NAFTA because trade has also been affected by a number of factors. The sharp 
devaluation of the peso at the end of the 1990s and the associated recession in Mexico had 
considerable effects on trade, as did the rapid growth of the U.S. economy during most of the 
1990s and, in later years, the economic slowdown caused by the 2008 financial crisis. Trade-
related job gains and losses since NAFTA may have accelerated trends that were ongoing prior to 
NAFTA and may not be totally attributable to the trade agreement. 
U.S. Trade Trends with NAFTA Partners 
Overall Trade 
U.S. trade with its NAFTA partners has more than tripled since the agreement took effect. It has 
increased more rapidly than trade with the rest of the world. Since 1993, trade with Mexico grew 
faster than trade with Canada or with non-NAFTA countries. In 2011, trilateral trade among 
NAFTA partners reached the $1 trillion threshold. In 2016, Canada was the leading market for 
U.S. exports, while Mexico ranked second. The two countries accounted for 34% of total U.S. 
exports in 2016. In imports, Canada and Mexico ranked second and third, respectively, as 
suppliers of U.S. imports in 2016. The two countries accounted for 26% of U.S. imports.43 
Most of the trade-related effects of NAFTA may be attributed to changes in trade and investment 
patterns with Mexico because economic integration between Canada and the United States had 
already been taking place. As mentioned previously, while NAFTA may have accelerated U.S.-
Mexico trade since 1993, other factors, such as economic growth patterns, also affected trade. As 
trade tends to increase during cycles of economic growth, it tends to decrease as growth declines. 
                                                 
39 See Ross Perot with Pat Choate, Save Your Job, Save Our Country: Why NAFTA Must be Stopped-Now!, New York, 
1993. 
40 For more information, see CRS Report R44546, The Economic Effects of Trade: Overview and Policy Challenges, by 
James K. Jackson. 
41 See for example, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges, 
Institute for International Economics, October 2005; Center for Strategic and International Studies, NAFTA’s Impact on 
North America: The First Decade, Edited by Sidney Weintraub, 2004; and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Opening 
Markets, Creating Jobs: Estimated U.S. Employment Effects of Trade with FTA Partners, 2010. 
42 See for example, Robert E. Scott, Heading South: U.S.-Mexico Trade and Job Displacement under NAFTA, 
Economic Policy Institute, May 3, 2011; and The Frederick S. Pardee Center, The Future of North American Trade 
Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, Boston University, November 2009.  
43 Trade statistics in this paragraph are based on Department of Commerce trade data.  
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The economic downturns in 2001 and 2009, for example, likely played a role in the decline in 
both U.S. exports to and imports from Canada and Mexico, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. U.S. Merchandise Trade with NAFTA Partners: 1993-2016 
(billions of nominal dollars) 
 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Interactive Tariff 
and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
Trade Balance and Petroleum Oil Products  
Trade in crude oil and petroleum products is a central component of U.S. trade with both Canada 
and Mexico. If these products are excluded from the trade balance, the deficit with NAFTA 
partners has been lower than the overall deficit in some years. In some years, the balance in non-
energy merchandise has been positive. For example, the balance in non-petroleum products went 
from a surplus of $8.7 billion in 2013 to a deficit of $49.8 billion in 2016 as shown in Figure 3. 
Petroleum products have accounted for 10-17% of total trade with NAFTA partners over the past 
10 years.  
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Figure 3. Trade with NAFTA Partners Excluding Petroleum Oil and Oil Products: 
1993-2016 
(billions of nominal dollars) 
 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (USITC’s) 
Interactive Tariff and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
Notes: The United States uses different classifications of trade for trade statistics. Trade data in this chart 
excludes energy trade in three categories: Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) code 2709, petroleum oils and oils 
from bituminous minerals, crude; HTS code 2710, petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals (other than 
crude) and products therefrom, NESOI, containing 70% (by weight) or more of these oils; and HTS code 2711, 
petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons. See http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
Trade by Product 
In 2016, U.S. imports in motor vehicles ranked first among the five leading import items from 
NAFTA partners, as shown in Figure 4.44 The next leading import items were crude petroleum 
oil, motor vehicle parts, motor vehicles for the transport of goods, and computer hardware. In 
2016, the top five U.S. export items to NAFTA partners were motor vehicle parts, non-crude 
petroleum oil products (mainly gasoline), motor vehicles, office machinery parts, and motor 
vehicles for the transport of goods, as shown in Figure 4. 
                                                 
44 This statistic is derived from the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS), using HTS number 2709 
for petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude. The HTS comprises a hierarchical structure for describing 
all goods in trade for duty, quota, and statistical purposes. This structure is based upon the international Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), administered by the World Customs Organization in Brussels. 
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Figure 4. Top Five U.S. Import and Export Items to and from NAFTA Partners 
(billions of nominal dollars) 
 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the USITC at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
Notes: This figure does not include low-value export shipments. Statistics are derived from the harmonized 
Tariff Schedule (HTS) of the United States at the 4-digit level. The HTS comprises a hierarchical structure for 
describing all goods in trade for duty, quota, and statistical purposes. This structure is based on the international 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), administered by the World Customs 
Organization in Brussels.  
Trade with Canada 
U.S. trade with Canada more than doubled in the first decade of the FTA/NAFTA (1989-1999) 
from $166.5 billion to $362.2 billion. U.S. exports to Canada increased from $100.2 billion in 
1993 to $312.1 billion in 2014, and then decreased to $266.8 billion in 2016. U.S. imports from 
Canada increased from $110.9 billion in 1993 to $349.3 billion in 2014, and then decreased to 
$278.1 billion in 2016 (see Table A-1). After falling off during the recession of 2001, total trade 
with Canada reached a new high of $600.6 billion in 2008, only to fall victim to the financial 
crisis in 2009 when it fell to $430.9 billion. The United States has run a trade deficit with Canada 
since the FTA/NAFTA era, increasing from $9.9 billion in 1989 to $78.3 billion in 2008, before 
falling back during the 2009 recession. In 2016, the trade deficit with Canada decreased further to 
$11.2 billion. While the trade deficit with Canada has been attributed to the FTA/NAFTA, 
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increases have been uneven and may also be attributed to other economic factors, such as energy 
prices.45 
In services, the United States had a surplus of $27.4 billion in 2015 in trade with Canada. U.S. 
private services exports to Canada increased from $17.0 billion in 1993 to $56.4 billion in 2015. 
U.S. private services imports from Canada increased from $9.1 billion in 1993 to $29.0 billion in 
2015, as shown in Table A-2.46 
Trade with Mexico 
The United States is, by far, Mexico’s leading partner in merchandise trade. U.S. exports to 
Mexico increased rapidly since NAFTA, increasing from $41.6 billion in 1993 to $231.0 billion 
in 2016, an increase of 455% (see Table A-1). U.S. imports from Mexico increased from $39.9 
billion in 1993 to $294.2 billion in 2016, an increase of 637%. The trade balance with Mexico 
went from a surplus of $1.7 billion in 1993 to a deficit of $74.8 billion in 2007. Since then, the 
trade deficit with Mexico has fallen to $63.2 billion in 2016.47  
In services, the United States had a surplus of $9.6 billion in 2016 in trade with Mexico. U.S. 
private services exports to Mexico increased from $10.4 billion in 1993 to $31.5 billion in 2015. 
U.S. private services imports from Mexico increased from $7.4 billion in 1993 to $21.9 billion in 
2015, as shown in Table A-2.48 
Effect on the U.S. Economy 
The overall net effect of NAFTA on the U.S. economy has been relatively small, primarily 
because total trade with both Mexico and Canada was equal to less than 5% of U.S. GDP at the 
time NAFTA went into effect. Because many, if not most, of the economic effects came as a result 
of U.S.-Mexico trade liberalization, it is also important to take into account that two-way trade 
with Mexico was equal to an even smaller percentage of GDP (1.4%) in 1994. Thus, any changes 
in trade patterns would not be expected to be significant in relation to the overall U.S. economy. A 
major challenge in assessing NAFTA is separating the effects that came as a result of the 
agreement from other factors. U.S. trade with Mexico and Canada was already growing prior to 
NAFTA and it likely would have continued to do so without an agreement. A 2003 report by the 
Congressional Budget Office observed that it was difficult to precisely measure the effects of 
NAFTA. It estimated that NAFTA likely increased annual U.S. GDP, but by a very small 
amount—“probably no more than a few billion dollars, or a few hundredths of a percent.”49 In 
some sectors, trade-related effects could have been more significant, especially in those industries 
that were more exposed to the removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, such as the textile, 
apparel, automotive, and agriculture industries. 
                                                 
45 Trade statistics in this paragraph are derived from data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Interactive 
Tariff and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
46 Services trade statistics in this paragraph are derived from the Bureau of Economic Analysis online database at 
http://www.bea.gov. 
47 Merchandise trade statistics in this paragraph are derived from data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s 
Interactive Tariff and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
48 Services trade statistics in this paragraph are derived from the Bureau of Economic Analysis online database at 
http://www.bea.gov. 
49 Congressional Budget Office of the United States, “The Effects of NAFTA on U.S.-Mexican Trade and GDP,” A 
CBO Paper, May 2003, p. xiv.  
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Studies by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) on the effects of NAFTA pointed 
out the difficulty in isolating the agreement’s effects from other factors. Although the effects of 
NAFTA are not easily measured, the USITC provided some estimates over the years. A 2003 
study estimated that U.S. GDP could experience an increase between 0.1% and 0.5% upon full 
implementation of the agreement.50 A more recent USITC report written in June 2016 on the 
economic impact of trade agreements implemented under Trade Promotion Authority provides a 
summary of the findings from literature on NAFTA after 2002.51 The report states that, in general, 
the findings show that NAFTA led “to a substantial increase in trade volumes for all three 
countries; a small increase in U.S. welfare; and little to no change in U.S. aggregate 
employment.”52 The 2016 USITC report also states that some studies find that trade with Mexico 
depressed U.S. wages in some industries and states, while wages in other industries increased. 
According to ITC, other studies show that, in general, NAFTA had “essentially no effect on real 
wages in the United States of either skilled or unskilled workers.”53  
U.S. Industries and Supply Chains 
Many economists and other observers have credited NAFTA with helping U.S. manufacturing 
industries, especially the U.S. auto industry, become more globally competitive through greater 
North American economic integration and the development of supply chains.54 Much of the 
increase in U.S.-Mexico trade, for example, can be attributed to specialization as manufacturing 
and assembly plants have reoriented to take advantage of economies of scale. As a result, supply 
chains have been increasingly crossing national boundaries as manufacturing work is performed 
wherever it is most efficient.55 A reduction in tariffs in a given sector not only affects prices in 
that sector but also in industries that purchase intermediate inputs from that sector. The 
importance of these direct and indirect effects is often overlooked, according to one study. The 
study suggests that these linkages offer important trade and welfare gains from free trade 
agreements and that ignoring these input-output linkages could underestimate potential trade 
gains.56 
Much of the trade between the United States and its NAFTA partners occurs in the context of 
production sharing as manufacturers in each country work together to create goods. The 
expansion of trade has resulted in the creation of vertical supply relationships, especially along 
the U.S.-Mexico border. The flow of intermediate inputs produced in the United States and 
exported to Mexico and the return flow of finished products greatly increased the importance of 
the U.S.-Mexico border region as a production site.57 U.S. manufacturing industries, including 
automotive, electronics, appliances, and machinery, all rely on the assistance of Mexican 
                                                 
50 USITC, “The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the Tokyo Round, U.S.-Israel FTA, U.S.-Canada FTA, 
NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round on the U.S. Economy,” Publication 3621, August 2003. 
51 United States International Trade Commission, Economic Impact of Trade Agreements Implemented Under Trade 
Authorities Procedures, Publication Number: 4614, June 2016, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/
pub4614.pdf#page=131&nameddest=1. 
52 Ibid, p. 255. 
53 Ibid, p. 259. 
54 Hufbauer and Schott, NAFTA Revisited, pp. 20-21. 
55 Ibid., p. 21. 
56 Lorenzo Caliendo and Fernando Parro, Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, November 2012, pp. 1-5. 
57 Gordon H. Hanson, North American Economic Integration and Industry Location, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, June 1998.  
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manufacturers. One report estimates that 40% of the content of U.S. imports from Mexico and 
25% of the content of U.S. imports from Canada are of U.S. origin. In comparison, U.S. imports 
from China are said to have only 4% U.S. content. Taken together, goods from Mexico and 
Canada represent about 75% of all the U.S. domestic content that returns to the United States as 
imports.58  
Auto Sector 
NAFTA removed Mexico’s protectionist auto decrees and was instrumental in the integration of 
the auto industry in all three countries. The auto sector experienced some of the most significant 
changes in trade following the agreement. NAFTA provisions consisted of a phased elimination 
of tariffs and the gradual removal of many non-tariff barriers to trade. It provided for uniform 
country of origin provisions, enhanced protection of intellectual property rights, adopted less 
restrictive government procurement practices, and eliminated performance requirements on 
investors from other NAFTA countries. U.S. auto manufacturers, such as Ford Motor Company, 
often rely on parts from the United States, Canada, and Mexico in the final assembly of a motor 
vehicle. Northern American auto parts producers may use inputs and components produced by 
another NAFTA partner to assemble parts, which are then shipped to another NAFTA country 
where they are assembled into a vehicle that is sold in any of the three countries.59 According to 
some estimates, autos manufactured in North America that are sold in the United States have a 
domestic content of between 47% and 85%.60 
Mexico’s Restrictive Auto Decrees Prior to NAFTA 
Beginning in the 1960s, Mexico had a restrictive import substitution policy through a series of Mexican Auto Decrees 
in which the government sought to supply the entire Mexican market through domestically produced automotive 
goods. The decrees: 
 established import tariffs as high as 25% on automotive goods; 
 had high restrictions on foreign auto production;  
 prohibited imports of finished vehicles;  
 imposed high domestic-content requirements on foreign manufacturers producing; and 
 issued export requirements in which a certain amount of exports was required for every dollar of imports.  
After joining the GATT, the government of Mexico issued the final decree in 1989, liberalizing rules on the industry, 
but not entirely eliminating them. At the time of NAFTA negotiations, auto manufacturers were still required to have 
a certain percentage of domestic content in their products and meet export requirements, both of which were 
considered huge impediments to the industry. In addition, Mexico had tariffs of 20% or more on imports of 
automobiles and auto parts. These trade restrictions were eliminated under NAFTA. 
Note: For more information, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, Institute for International Economics, 
North American Free Trade, Issues and Recommendations, 1992, pp. 209-234. 
After NAFTA’s entry into force, U.S. trade in vehicles and auto parts increased rapidly. Mexico 
became a more significant trading partner in the motor vehicle market as U.S. auto exports to 
Mexico increased 262% while imports increased 765% between 1993 and 2016 as shown in 
Table 1. Mexico’s share in U.S. total trade in motor vehicles increased during this time period, 
                                                 
58 Robert Koopman, William Powers, and Zhi Wang, et al., Give Credit Where Credit is Due: Tracing Value Added in 
Global Production Chains, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 16426, Cambridge, MA, 
September 2010, p. 8. 
59 Business Roundtable, NAFTA: A Decade of Growth, p. 8. 
60 Matthew Philips and Cristina Lindblad, “Trump Threatens to Undo NAFTA’s Auto Alley,” Bloomberg, January 26, 
2016. 
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while the share from Canada and other countries decreased. Mexico was the leading supplier of 
automotive goods for the United States in 2016, accounting for 30% ($96.0 billion) of total U.S. 
motor vehicle and auto parts imports. Canada ranked second, accounting for 19% ($60.7 billion) 
of total U.S. imports in motor vehicles and auto parts in 2016.61 
Table 1. U.S. Trade in Motor Vehicles and Parts: 1993 and 2016 
(billions of dollars) 
 
1993 2016 
% Change 
1993-2016 
Exports Imports Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports 
Mexico         
Vehicles 0.2 3.7 3.9 4.6 49.7 54.3 2222% 1242% 
Parts 7.3 7.4 14.7 22.5 46.3 68.9 209% 526% 
Total 7.5 11.1 18.6 27.2 96.0 123.2 262% 765% 
Canada              
Vehicles 8.2 26.7 34.9 26.1 46.7 72.7 218% 75% 
Parts 18.2 10.3 28.5 26.4 14.0 40.5 45% 36% 
Total 26.4 37.0 63.4 52.5 60.7 113.2 99% 64% 
World              
Vehicles 18.9 63.0 81.9 68.4 199.5 267.9 262% 217% 
Parts 33.4 38.3 71.7 64.08 115.4 179.5 92% 201% 
Total 52.3 101.3 153.6 132.5 314.9 447.4 153% 211% 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the USITC at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. For 2016, “vehicles” 
consists of items under the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) number 3361 and “parts” 
consists of items under NAIC number 3363. The NAICS is the standard used by Federal statistical agencies in 
classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related 
to the U.S. business economy.  
Effect on Mexico 
A number of studies have found that NAFTA has brought economic and social benefits to the 
Mexican economy as a whole, but that the benefits have not been evenly distributed throughout 
the country.62 The agreement also had a positive impact on Mexican productivity. A 2011 World 
Bank study found that the increase in trade integration after NAFTA had a positive effect on 
                                                 
61 Merchandise trade statistics in this paragraph are derived from data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s 
Interactive Tariff and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
62 See for example, Robert A. Blecker and Gerardo Esquivel, NAFTA, Trade, and Development, Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies (San Diego), El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and 
El Colegio de Mexico, WP 10-03, 2010; and Daniel Lederman, William F. Maloney, and Luis Servén, Lessons from 
NAFTA for Latin America and the Caribbean, The World Bank, 2005. 
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stimulating the productivity of Mexican plants.63 Most post-NAFTA studies on economic effects 
have found that the net overall effects on the Mexican economy tended to be positive but modest. 
While there have been periods of positive and negative economic growth in Mexico after the 
agreement was implemented, it is difficult to measure precisely how much of these economic 
changes was attributed to NAFTA. A World Bank study assessing some of the economic impacts 
from NAFTA on Mexico concluded that NAFTA helped Mexico get closer to the levels of 
development in the United States and Canada. The study states that NAFTA helped Mexican 
manufacturers adapt to U.S. technological innovations more quickly; likely had positive impacts 
on the number and quality of jobs; reduced macroeconomic volatility, or wide variations in the 
GDP growth rate, in Mexico; increased the levels of synchronicity in business cycles in Mexico, 
the United States, and Canada; and reinforced the high sensitivity of Mexican economic sectors to 
economic developments in the United States.64 
Other studies suggest that NAFTA has been disappointing in that it failed to significantly improve 
the Mexican economy or lower income disparities between Mexico and its northern neighbors.65 
Some argue that the success of NAFTA in Mexico was probably limited by the fact that NAFTA 
was not supplemented by complementary policies that could have promoted a deeper regional 
integration effort. These policies could have included improvements in education, industrial 
policies, and/or investment in infrastructure.66 
One of the more controversial aspects of NAFTA is related to the agricultural sector in Mexico 
and the perception that NAFTA has caused a higher amount of Mexican worker displacement in 
this sector than in other economic sectors. Many critics of NAFTA say that the agreement led to a 
large number of job losses in Mexican agriculture, especially in the corn sector. One study 
estimates these losses to have been over 1 million lost jobs in corn production between 1991 and 
2000.67 However, while some of the changes in the agricultural sector are a direct result of 
NAFTA as Mexico began to import more lower-priced products from the United States, many of 
the changes can be attributed to Mexico’s unilateral agricultural reform measures in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Most domestic reform measures consisted of privatization efforts and resulted in 
increased competition. Measures included eliminating state enterprises related to agriculture and 
removing staple price supports and subsidies.68 These reforms coincided with NAFTA 
negotiations and continued beyond the implementation of NAFTA in 1994. The unilateral reforms 
in the agricultural sector make it difficult to separate those effects from the effects of NAFTA. 
                                                 
63 Rafael E. de Hoyos and Leonardo Iacovone, Economic Performance under NAFTA, The World Bank Development 
Research Group, May 2011, pp. 25-27. 
64 Daniel Lederman, William F. Maloney, and Luis Servén, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, The World Bank, 2005.  
65 Robert A. Blecker and Gerardo Esquivel, NAFTA, Trade, and Development, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, the 
Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, and El Colegio de México, USMEX 
WP 10-03, 2010.  
66 Ibid., p. 22.  
67 Robert E. Scott, Carlos Salas, Bruce Campbell and Jeff Faux, Revisiting NAFTA: Still Not Working for North 
America’s Workers, Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper #173, p. 43.  
68 Mexico’s unilateral agricultural reform measures removed government subsidies and price controls in the agricultural 
sector that resulted in rising prices for tortillas. Tortillas are the basic staple for the Mexican diet and a necessity of the 
poor. For this reason, higher prices had a greater effect on the poor than on middle- and higher-income Mexicans. 
Mexico also reformed its Agrarian Law. Lands that had been distributed to ejidos or community rural groups following 
the 1910 revolution gained the right to privatize. This led to more efficient production processes, especially in Northern 
states. 
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U.S.-Mexico Trade Market Shares 
Mexico relies heavily on the United States as an export market; this reliance has diminished very 
slightly over the years. The percentage of Mexico’s total exports going to the United States 
decreased from 83% in 1993 to 81% in 2015 (see Figure 5). In addition, its share of the U.S. 
market has lost ground since 2003 when China surpassed Mexico as the second-leading supplier 
of U.S. imports. The United States is losing market share of Mexico’s import market. Between 
1993 and 2015, the U.S. share of Mexico’s imports decreased from 78% to 54%. China is 
Mexico’s second-leading source of imports. 
Figure 5. Market Share as Percentage of Total Trade: Mexico and the United States 
(1993-2015) 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, from IMF International Financial Statistics. Data for 2016 was not yet 
available. 
Note: Represents exports to and imports from other country as percentage of country’s total trade.  
U.S. and Mexican Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between 
the United States and Mexico for many years, especially after NAFTA. Two-way investment 
increased rapidly after the agreement went into effect. The United States is the largest source of 
FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI in Mexico increased from $15.2 billion in 1993 to $104.4 
billion in 2012 (587%), and then decreased to $92.8 billion in 2015 (see Table A-4). The flows of 
FDI have been affected by other factors over the years, with higher growth during the period of 
economic expansion during the late 1990s, and slower growth in recent years, possibly due to the 
economic downturn caused by the 2008 global financial crisis and/or the increased violence in 
Mexico. Mexican FDI in the United States, while substantially lower than U.S. investment in 
Mexico, has also increased rapidly, from $1.2 billion in 1993 to $16.6 billion in 2015 (1283% 
increase) (See Table A-4.)69 
                                                 
69 Foreign direct investment data in this section is derived from data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis online 
database at http://www.bea.gov. 
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While Mexico’s unilateral trade and investment liberalization measures in the 1980s and early 
1990s contributed to the increase of U.S. FDI in Mexico, NAFTA provisions on foreign 
investment may have helped to lock in Mexico’s reforms and increase investor confidence. 
NAFTA helped give U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their 
investments as well as investor protection in Mexico. Nearly half of total FDI investment in 
Mexico is in the manufacturing industry. 
Income Disparity 
One of the main arguments in favor of NAFTA at the time it was being proposed by policymakers 
was that the agreement would improve economic conditions in Mexico and narrow the income 
disparity between Mexico and the United States and Canada. Studies that have addressed the 
issue of economic convergence70 have noted that economic convergence in North America has 
failed to materialize. One study states that NAFTA failed to fulfill the promise of closing the 
Mexico-U.S. development gap and that this was partially due to the lack of deeper forms of 
regional integration or cooperation between Mexico and the United States.71 The study contends 
that domestic policies in both countries, along with underlying geographic and demographic 
realities, contribute to the continuing disparities in income. The authors argue that neither Mexico 
nor the United States adopted complementary policies after NAFTA that could have promoted a 
more successful regional integration effort. These policies could include education, industrial 
policies, and more investment in border and transportation infrastructure. The authors also note 
that other developments, such as increased security along the U.S.-Mexico border after the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, have made it much more difficult for the movement of 
goods and services across the border and for improving regional integration. They argue that the 
two countries could cooperate on policies that foster convergence and economic development in 
Mexico instead of increasing security and “building walls.”72  
A World Bank study states that NAFTA brought economic and social benefits to the Mexican 
economy, but that it is not enough to help narrow the disparities in economic conditions between 
Mexico and the United States.73 It contends that Mexico needs to invest more in education, 
innovation, and infrastructure, and in the quality of national institutions. The study also states that 
income convergence between a Latin American country and the United States is limited by the 
wide differences in the quality of domestic institutions, in the innovation dynamics of domestic 
firms, and in the skills of the labor force. While NAFTA had a positive effect on wages and 
employment in some Mexican states, the wage differential within the country increased as a result 
of trade liberalization.74 Another study also notes that the ability of Mexico to improve economic 
conditions depends on its capacity to improve its national institutions, adding that Mexican 
                                                 
70 Economic convergence can be broadly defined as a narrowing of the disparities in the economic levels and the 
manufacturing performances of particular countries or their regions. The goal of the theory of economic convergence is 
to research and analyze the factors influencing the rates of economic growth and real per capita income in countries. 
71 Robert A. Blecker and Gerardo Esquivel, NAFTA, Trade, and Development, Working Paper 10-03, Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies (San Diego), the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center (Washington DC), El Colegio de la 
Frontera Norte (Tijuana), and El Colegio de México (Mexico City), 2010, p. 2. 
72 Ibid., pp. 19-23. 
73 Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the Caribbean, The World Bank, 
2005. 
74 Ibid. 
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institutions did not improve significantly more than those of other Latin American countries since 
NAFTA went into effect.75 
Effect on Canada 
As noted earlier, the U.S.-Canada FTA came into effect on January 1, 1989. Thus, trade 
liberalization between the two countries was well underway—or already completed—by the time 
of the implementation of NAFTA. This section summarizes the effect of trade liberalization from 
both agreements on Canada. 
From the Canadian perspective, the important consequence of the FTA may have been what did 
not happen, that is, that many of the fears of opening up trade with the United States did not come 
to pass. Canada did not become an economic appendage or “51st state,” as many had feared. It did 
not lose control over its water or energy resources; its manufacturing sector was not gutted from 
the agreement. Rather, as one Canadian commentator remarked, “free trade helped Canada to 
grow up, to turn its face out to the world, to embrace its future as a trading nation, [and] to get 
over its chronic sense of inferiority.”76 However, some hopes for the FTA, for example, that it 
would be a catalyst for greater productivity in Canadian industry, also have not come to pass. 
U.S.-Canada Trade Market Shares 
Canada is the second largest trading partner of the United States with $578.6 billion crossing the 
border in both directions in 2016, resulting in a trade deficit of $12.1billion. The United States is 
the number one purchaser of Canadian goods and supplier of imports to Canada. Canada’s share 
of its exports going to the United States steadily increased during the 1980s, from 60.6% in 1980 
to 70.7% in 1989, the first year of the FTA. Canada’s percentage of total exports to the United 
States continued to increase, reaching 87.7% in 2002. The relative importance of the value of 
U.S. and Canadian trade with each other, however, has been falling in recent years. Since 2002, 
this percentage has fallen back to 76.4% in 2016. The U.S. share of Canada’s total imports, which 
reached a peak of 70.0% in 1983, has steadily declined to a recent 52.1% in 2015 (Figure 6). 
Canada likes to point out that it is the leading export destination for 35 U.S. states.77 
Traditionally, Canada was the largest purchaser of U.S. exports and supplier of U.S. imports; 
however, shares of both peaked before the FTA. Canada purchased 23.5% of U.S. exports in 1987 
and equaled that figure in 2005, but it has since fallen to 18.3% in 2016. Canada traditionally was 
the largest supplier of U.S. imports, peaking at 20.6% in 1984, reaching a NAFTA high of 20.1% 
in 1996, but declining thereafter to 12.6% in 2016. China displaced Canada as the largest supplier 
of U.S. imports in 2007, and Mexico edged out Canada for second spot in 2015. Canada remains 
the largest trading partner of the United States when trade in services is taken into account. 
                                                 
75 William Easterly, Norbert Fiess, and Daniel Lederman, “NAFTA and Convergence in North America: High 
Expectations, Big Events, Little Time,” Economía, Fall 2003. 
76 John Ibbitson, “After 25 Years, Free-Trade Deal with U.S. Has Helped Canada Grow Up,” The Globe and Mail, 
September 29, 2012. 
77 “Canada: A trading nation,” Canadian embassy website http://canam.gc.ca/relations/
commercial_relations_commerciales.aspx?lang=eng. 
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Figure 6. Market Share as Percentage of Total Trade: Canada and the United States 
(1993-2015) 
 
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit, from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
Note: Represents exports to and imports from other country as percentage of country’s total trade. 
The composition of trade has also changed. Canada initially entered a manufacturing recession 
after the FTA entered into force as branch plants of U.S. companies set up behind the Canadian 
tariff wall were abandoned. However, more internationally competitive manufacturing sectors 
thrived as long as the Canadian dollar (nicknamed the loonie for the soaring loon pictured on its 
reverse) was relatively cheap. From a low point of a Canadian dollar worth US$0.65 in 2002, the 
loonie reached parity in 2007, and has hovered around the parity point until 2013 before sliding to 
a recent US$ 0.75 at the end of 2016. The appreciation was attributed to the boom in Canada’s 
natural resources—oil and gas displaced motor vehicles as Canada’s largest export to the United 
States in 2005. The value of Canadian dollar is dependent on its commodity exports, and the 
depreciation resulted from the end of the boom that accompanied China’s slowdown.  
The “great recession” resulting from the 2008 financial crisis took a toll on Canadian 
manufacturing, which was exacerbated by the strong loonie in the 2010-2013 period. However, 
the recovery of the North American economy and the fall of the loonie after 2013 has not 
significantly improved the fortunes of some sectors of Canadian manufacturing. The Canadian 
auto sector is a case in point. Despite contributing C$12 billion to the bailout of General Motors 
and Chrysler, no new auto assembly plant in Canada has opened since 2009, model lines have 
been shifted to Mexico or the United States,78 and by 2014, Canada’s share of North American 
vehicle output fell to 14%. According to the Royal Bank of Canada, “Planned capacity expansion 
in Mexico, including several new plants in the next few years, as well as stronger investment in 
the United States, could result in further erosion of Canadian producers’ market share ... the same 
is true for Canadian parts manufacturers, who have lost a significant share of the US import 
market.”79  
                                                 
78 Chris Chase, “A brief history of auto manufacturing in Canada,” http://www.autotrader.ca/newsfeatures/20160901/a-
brief-history-of-auto-manufacturing-in-canada/#EWFjdFpEwMcMBGjq.97. 
79 Royal Bank of Canada, “A look at the recovery of the Canadian auto sector since the 2008-2009 recession,” May 
2014, http://www.rbc.com/economics/economic-reports/pdf/other-reports/Auto_May_2014.pdf. 
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 For some advocates in Canada, free trade was meant to alleviate the long-term labor productivity 
gap between the United States and Canada. Open competition was seen as forcing Canadian 
industry to be more productive. Since NAFTA, this gap could be accounted for by the low value 
of the Canadian dollar. As adding capital equipment (often purchased from the United States) was 
relatively more expensive than hiring extra workers, the latter was often employed. The 
appreciation of the Canadian dollar made additional capitalization more attractive, but labor 
productivity recently remained only at 72% of U.S. levels.80 The relatively low productivity 
levels of Canadian industry, as well as its relatively low investments in research and development 
(R&D), and relatively lower expenditures on information technology, are seen as threatening to 
Canadian long-term competitiveness. This remains a concern to Canadian policymakers despite 
Canada leading the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) ranking 
in population with post-secondary education.81 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Two-way investment has also increased markedly since NAFTA, both in terms of stock and flow 
of investment. The United States is the largest single investor in Canada with a stock of FDI into 
Canada reaching $352.9 billion in 2015, up from a stock of $69.9 billion in 1993 (see Table A-4). 
U.S. investment represents 49.4% of the total stock of FDI in Canada from global investors. U.S. 
FDI flows into Canada averaged $3.28 billion in the five years prior to the FTA, and actually fell 
to an average of $1.7 billion in the first six years of the FTA, mainly attributed to divestments of 
U.S.-owned branch plants in Canada. However, U.S. flows into Canada have increased markedly 
to an average of $20.1 billion during the 10 years from 2005-2015.82 The stock of U.S. FDI is 
now equivalent to 22% of the value of Canadian GDP, in contrast to 1% at the beginning of the 
FTA. 
While Canada is not the largest investor in the United States, the United States was the largest 
destination for Canadian FDI in 2015 with a stock of $269.0 billion, an increase from $26.6 
billion in 1988.83 Approximately 42.2% of Canadian FDI was invested in the United States in 
2014. Canadian FDI flows into the United States annually averaged $2.3 billion in five years 
prior to the FTA, and an annual average of $1.8 billion during the FTA years, but more recently 
increased to an annual average of $9.9 billion in the 10 years to 2015. These trends highlight the 
changing view of FDI among Canadians, from one that could be considered fearful or hostile to 
FDI as vehicles of foreign control over the Canadian economy, to one that is more welcoming of 
new jobs and techniques that result from FDI. 
Procedures for NAFTA Renegotiation or Withdrawal 
On May 18, 2017, the U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer sent a 90-day notification to 
Congress of the Administration’s intent to begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As noted above, President Trump advocated 
for the renegotiation of NAFTA in the 2016 election campaign, or, perhaps, even withdrawing 
                                                 
80 Kevin Lynch, “Canada’s Challenge—From Good to Great,” Inside Policy, October 2012. 
81 Glen Hodgson, “Canada U.S. Competitiveness, Addressing the Canadian Economic Contradiction,” Woodrow 
Wilson Center, Canada Institute, June 2007; Lynch, ibid. 
82 Investment statistics are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Statistics 
Canada. 
83 Ibid. 
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from the agreement itself. The following is a discussion of the procedural aspects of reopening 
NAFTA and the respective roles of the President and Congress.  
Renegotiation  
NAFTA provides that 
1. The Parties may agree on any modification of or addition to this Agreement.  
2. When so agreed, and approved in accordance with the applicable legal 
procedures of each party, a modification or addition shall constitute an integral 
part of the agreement.84  
Under Article II of the Constitution, the President has the authority to negotiate with foreign 
countries. If President Trump decides to renegotiate NAFTA, implementation of the renegotiated 
agreement in domestic law would likely take one of two forms, depending on the subject of the 
negotiations: Presidential proclamation85 or, if renegotiation is expected to result in changes to 
U.S. law, the President likely would seek expedited treatment of the implementing legislation 
under the Bipartisan Comprehensive Trade Promotion and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA).86  
Some modifications to NAFTA may be proclaimed by the President pursuant to existing statutory 
authority. These include tariff modifications, basic and specific rules of origin, and certain 
customs provisions. In these cases, they can take effect 15 days after proclamation. However, 
certain proclamations are subject to consultation and layover requirements, including “such 
additional duties as the President determines to be necessary or appropriate to maintain the 
general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions with respect to Canada or 
Mexico provided for by the Agreement.87  
The consultation and layover provisions are applicable to proclamations concerning 
 tariff modification, including acceleration of tariff staging;  
 modification of rules of origin specific to carpets and sweaters (Annex 300-B);  
 modifications to specific rules of origin (Annex 401);  
 automotive tracing requirement (Annexes 403.1, 403.2);  
 regional value-content provisions for certain autos (Annex 403.3); and 
 modification of rules of origin definitions. 
NAFTA’s implementing legislation did not provide for expedited procedures for legislative 
changes resulting from amendments to the agreement. The Senate report language on the 
implementing bill suggested that “[i]t is expected that normal legislative procedures would apply 
to any such legislation.”88  
                                                 
84 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Article 2202, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/
North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement. 
85 CRS Legal Sidebar, Renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement: What Actions do not Require 
Congressional Approval, by Brandon Murrill http://www.crs.gov/LegalSidebar/details/1724?source=search 
86 P.L. 114-26  
87 P.L. 103-182, Section 201 (b). Under the consultation and layover requirement, the President must obtain advice 
from private sector advisory committees and the International Trade Commission (ITC); submit a report to the 
Committees on Ways and Means and Finance on the proposed actions; and consult with the Committees and allows at 
least 60 days following the report to elapse prior to imposing the duty. 
88 Senate Finance Committee, Report 103-189, North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, November 
(continued...) 
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Renegotiation of other provisions of NAFTA that would require changes to U.S. law likely would 
require implementing legislation. Such legislation could be considered under TPA.89 TPA is the 
time-limited authority that Congress uses to set trade negotiating objectives, to establish 
notification and consultation requirements, and to have implementing bills for certain reciprocal 
trade agreements considered under expedited procedures, provided certain requirements are met. 
TPA currently is in effect until July 1, 2021, provided that Congress does not pass an extension 
disapproval resolution in the sixty days prior to July 1, 2018. Under TPA, the President can 
initiate negotiations whenever  
one or more existing duties or any other import restriction of any foreign country or the 
United States or any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international trade unduly 
burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the United States or adversely affects the United 
States economy ... 
90
  
In order to use the expedited procedures of TPA, the President must notify and consult with 
Congress before initiating negotiations, give Congress a 90-day notice of intent to begin 
negotiations )(sent on May 18, 2017), notify and consult with Congress during the course of the 
negotiations, and must adhere to several reporting requirements following the conclusion of any 
negotiations resulting in an agreement. The President must conduct the negotiations based on the 
negotiating objectives set forth by Congress in TPA legislation. If the President adheres to these 
and other requirements, then implementing legislation from the resulting agreement can be 
considered under expedited procedures, including guaranteed consideration, no amendments, and 
an up-or-down vote. 
Withdrawal 
NAFTA provides that a country can withdraw from the agreement “six months after it has 
provided written notice of withdrawal to the other parties.” It also provides that the agreement 
shall remain in force for the other parties.91  
As a practical matter, it appears that the President has the ability to terminate U.S. international 
commitments under international agreements, including trade agreements, in accordance with the 
agreements’ terms and the rules for withdrawal from treaties in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. In addition, it seems unlikely that a domestic court would find a case challenging 
such action to be suitable for judicial review.92 It appears that the President, then, can withdraw 
from the agreement as a matter of international law six months after providing written notice to 
the other parties pursuant to NAFTA Article 2205 above. The issue of subsequent tariff rates is 
informed by Sec. 125 of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618), incorporated by reference in the 
NAFTA Implementation Act. Under this provision, the existing NAFTA rates would be continued 
for one year. However, during this time, the President can proclaim the tariff rates existing prior 
to NAFTA. This likely would be the most-favored-nation (MFN) rate for Mexico, but for Canada 
                                                                
(...continued) 
18, 1993, p. 9. 
89 For more information about TPA, see CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. 
Fergusson, and CRS Report R43491, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, by Ian F. 
Fergusson and Richard S. Beth. 
90 P.L. 114-26, Sec. 103(b).  
91 NAFTA, Article 2205.  
92 See CRS Report R44630, U.S. Withdrawal from Free Trade Agreements: Frequently Asked Legal Questions, by 
Brandon J. Murrill. 
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it could also be the applicable rates from the preceding U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 
(CFTA). Within two months of the withdrawal date, the President shall recommend the rates to be 
established with Canada and Mexico. Presumably, this would be the MFN that is accorded to all 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is unclear whether the President’s 
proclamation of prior tariff rates would remain in effect for more than a year after withdrawal. 
Despite the President’s ability to withdraw from the agreement, the repeal of statutory provisions 
implementing NAFTA would likely require congressional assent.93 
An interesting question is the basis on which U.S.-Canada trade would be conducted following a 
withdrawal from NAFTA. Sec. 107 of the NAFTA implementing legislation “suspended” CFTA 
during the time that the two countries remain parties to NAFTA. It amended CFTA implementing 
legislation to supersede certain of its provisions while continuing other provisions. The CFTA 
potentially could “snap-back” into force after a withdrawal from NAFTA, but it may require the 
issuance of a presidential proclamation to return it into force. 
Issues for Congress 
A key issue for the 115th Congress is the direction of U.S. trade policy under the Trump 
Administration, especially the prospective renegotiation of NAFTA. Congress may wish to 
consider ways in which NAFTA could be modernized and renegotiated, the congressional role in 
the prospective renegotiation, the negotiating positions of Mexico and Canada, and the 
ramifications of a possible withdrawal from NAFTA. Congress could also consider new “21st 
Century” issues addressed in recent U.S. FTAs, such as the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement and 
TPP, and whether these could be potential topics of discussion in regard to NAFTA. If the United 
States were to completely withdraw from NAFTA, it could result in significant disruptions to 
extensive North American production chains and cause job losses in all three countries. On the 
other hand, depending on how the President and Congress choose to move forward, there could 
be opportunities to review the successes of NAFTA and where it has not met expectations.  
Many economists and business representatives generally look to maintain the trade relationship 
with Canada and Mexico under NAFTA to improve overall relations and economic integration 
within the region. However, labor groups and some consumer-advocacy groups argue that the 
agreement has resulted in outsourcing and lower wages that have had a negative effect on the 
U.S. economy. Some proponents and critics of NAFTA agree that the three countries may wish to 
look at what the agreement has failed to do as they look to the future of North American trade and 
economic relations. Policies could include updating or “modernizing” provisions to include 
commitments in more recent U.S. FTAs. 
Potential Topics for Prospective NAFTA Renegotiation 
NAFTA parties have not specifically stated how NAFTA should be renegotiated, or what changes 
they may seek if the agreement is amended. The agreement is more than 20 years old and 
renegotiation may provide opportunities to address issues not currently covered in NAFTA. The 
following selective topics could be some areas of discussion.  
                                                 
93 It is unclear whether Section 109(b) of the NAFTA Implementation Act would effectively terminate certain 
provisions of the act in the event that the United States withdrew from the agreement. 
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Automotive Sector 
The United States, Canada, and Mexico may seek to negotiate new rules of origin to address 
modern developments in auto and auto parts manufacturing or to encourage more production in 
the North American auto manufacturing industry by raising the rules of origin requirement. 
NAFTA phased out Mexico’s restrictive auto decree and opened the Mexican auto sector to 
foreign investment from the United States. It liberalized North American auto trade and was 
instrumental in the integration of the North American auto industry. NAFTA phased out all U.S. 
tariffs on automotive imports from Mexico and Mexican tariffs on U.S. and Canadian products as 
long as they met the rules of origin requirements of 62.5% content for autos, light trucks, engines 
and transmissions; and 60% for all other vehicles and automotive parts.  
Services 
The United States has a highly competitive services sector and has made services trade 
liberalization a priority in its negotiations of FTAs, including NAFTA.94 NAFTA covers core 
obligations in services trade in a separate chapter, but because of the complexity of the issues, it 
also covers services trade provisions in several other related chapters, including financial services 
and telecommunications services. NAFTA parties may consider new services commitments, such 
as those in TPP, including commitments to remove barriers to electronic payment card services, 
electronic signatures, mobile telecommunications, international roaming rates, and additional 
market access in areas such as audiovisual services and allowing firms to transmit data across 
borders.95  
E-Commerce, Data Flows, and Data Localization 
The role of the Internet in international commerce has expanded dramatically since NAFTA’s 
implementation over 20 years ago. While technological advancements have fundamentally 
changed how firms trade and do business across international borders, some companies argue that 
new barriers have also emerged, which existing trade rules fail to address. NAFTA parties could 
consider discussions on issues related to cross-border transfer of information by electronic means 
or forced localization of data centers. Such provisions could provide North American firms more 
flexibility in where they process and store data relevant to their business. Some of these issues 
were addressed in TPP. 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
NAFTA was the first FTA to contain an IPR chapter.96 The WTO Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement that came into effect a year later was modeled 
after the NAFTA IPR chapter. The chapter also predated widespread use of the Internet. Since 
NAFTA, IPR provisions in U.S. FTAs have evolved in several ways and NAFTA parties may 
consider expanded provisions. For example, the TPP included IPR provisions on copyright in the 
digital environment, additional patent protections for pharmaceuticals, criminal penalties for trade 
                                                 
94 For more information, see CRS Report R43291, U.S. Trade in Services: Trends and Policy Issues, by Rachel F. 
Fefer, and CRS Report R44354, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations: Overview and Issues for Congress, 
by Rachel F. Fefer. 
95 For more details, see CRS Report R44489, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for 
Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson and Brock R. Williams.  
96 See CRS In Focus IF10033, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar 
and Ian F. Fergusson.  
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secret theft, provisions for customs agents to have ex officio authority to seize counterfeit and 
pirated goods, and requirements for countries to provide criminal penalties for copyright and 
trademark infringement in the digital environment.  
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
NAFTA includes provisions on state-owned enterprises, but they are limited in scope. A possible 
area of renegotiation could include discussions on SOEs to address issues such as those 
negotiated in TPP.97 These could include addressing potential commercial disadvantages to 
private sector firms from state-supported competitors receiving preferential treatment.  
Investment 
All three countries may have an interest in revising the NAFTA investment chapter to reflect 
more recent agreements. U.S. FTAs, including NAFTA, and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
maintain core investor protections reflecting U.S. law, such as obligations for governments to 
provide investors with non-discriminatory treatment, a minimum standard of treatment, and 
protections against uncompensated expropriation, among other provisions.98 Since NAFTA, 
investment chapters in FTAs and the U.S. model BIT have undergone changes in order to clarify 
certain provisions and generally to affirm a government’s right to regulate to pursue 
environmental, health, or safety outcomes. Investment chapters, especially the investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) provision, have drawn increased scrutiny in recent U.S. FTAs. NAFTA 
was the first FTA to contain ISDS, which allows investors to bring arbitration against a host 
government to binding arbitration to resolve disputes over alleged violations of a host 
government’s investment obligations.  
Dispute Settlement 
Alone among current U.S. FTAs, NAFTA contains a binational dispute settlement mechanism 
(Chapter 19) to review anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) decisions of a 
domestic administrative body. This mechanism was created as a compromise with Canada in the 
CFTA, which had sought to eliminate AD/CVD between the two countries. Mexico also 
supported including the provision during the negotiation of NAFTA. However, some U.S. 
industry groups that have been adversely affected by Chapter 19 decisions have sought 
elimination of the NAFTA binational review panel provisions.  
NAFTA also created a state-to-state mechanism (Chapter 20) to resolve disputes arising from the 
agreement. This dispute settlement mechanism has rarely been used, in part because the 
provisions of NAFTA substantially overlap with those of the WTO, which came into force a year 
after NAFTA. WTO dispute settlement has been used extensively—over 500 cases brought—due 
to perceived advantages including an appellate mechanism and a growing body of precedent. 
However, if NAFTA is revised with provisions not in WTO agreements, NAFTA panels may be 
used more and their ability to function properly may be examined in any renegotiation. 
                                                 
97 For more information, see CRS Report R44489, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for 
Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson and Brock R. Williams. 
98 For more information on U.S. investment agreements, see CRS In Focus IF10052, U.S. International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs), by Martin A. Weiss and Shayerah Ilias Akhtar. 
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Labor 
NAFTA marked the first time that worker rights provisions were associated with an FTA. The 
United States may seek to strengthen NAFTA provisions related to the protection of worker 
rights. The TPP, and more recent U.S. trade agreements, such as the U.S.-Colombia Trade 
Promotion Agreement, include stronger provisions in which parties must adopt, enforce, and not 
derogate from laws incorporating internationally recognized principles for the protection of 
worker rights, in a manner affecting trade and investment. 99 NAFTA only includes provisions for 
parties to enforce their own labor laws. After TPP negotiations were concluded, Mexico was 
reportedly developing labor reforms independent of the TPP to address concerns raised by 
organized labor.100 According to the USTR, Mexico had agreed to develop “parallel reforms” to 
make its labor laws consistent with TPP labor provisions in protecting collective bargaining and 
reforming its system for administering labor justice.101  
Environment 
NAFTA was the first U.S. FTA that included provisions related to the environment. The United 
States could seek to hold NAFTA parties to more enforceable environmental provisions such as 
those in more recent FTAs that require parties to adopt, enforce and not derogate from their 
environmental laws to attract trade and investment, implement specified MEAs they have joined, 
among other provisions.102 NAFTA parties could also seek to increase cooperation to address 
trans-national threats and police environmental crimes such as endangered species trade and 
illegal fishing; and support inclusive and transparent policymaking in the future through rules 
requiring publication of laws and regulations, and through promoting broad public participation 
in policymaking. 
Energy 
NAFTA’s provisions on investment include exemptions in the energy sector in Mexico in which 
the Mexican government reserved the right to prohibit foreign investment. The United States may 
seek greater access to Mexico’s oil sector or to enhance bilateral cooperation on energy 
production and security. In regard to Canada, CFTA and NAFTA energy chapters contain a so-
called “proportionality” provision. This provision provides that a domestic restriction on 
Canadian energy exports cannot reduce the proportion of exports delivered to the United States. 
The chapter also prohibits pricing discrimination between domestic consumption and exports to 
the United States. Some Canadians maintain that this provision restricts the ability of Canada to 
make energy policy decisions and may seek to change this provision.  
Customs and Trade Facilitation 
Given the magnitude and frequency of U.S. trade with NAFTA partners, changes in the customs 
procedures on either side of the border could have a significant impact on companies engaged in 
                                                 
99 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10046, Worker Rights Provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), by 
Ian F. Fergusson and M. Angeles Villarreal, and CRS In Focus IF10452, TPP: Labor Provisions, by M. Angeles 
Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson. 
100 “U.S., Mexico Continue Discussing Labor Reforms after TPP Conclusion,” World Trade Online, October 8, 2015. 
101 For more information, see https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/labour-66e8e6f4e8d5#.qbrdwn6pn.  
102 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10166, Environmental Provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), by 
Richard K. Lattanzio and Ian F. Fergusson.  
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bilateral trade.103 Discussions could address customs automation procedures, the creation of a 
single-access window at one entry point for importers and exporters, automated risk analysis and 
targeting, expeditious responses to requests for information on quotas or country of origin 
markings, special customs procedures for express shipments, or publicly available customs laws.  
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) 
Sanitary and phytosanitary standards refer to commitments relating to scientifically-based human 
health and animal/plant safety in the trade of agriculture products. NAFTA parties could consider 
commitments agreed to under the proposed TPP that went beyond both NAFTA and World Trade 
Organization commitments, such as science-based and transparent regulatory activities, including 
the use of risk analysis to improve the scientific basis of SPS regulation, notifications to importers 
or exporters of shipments detained for SPS issues, or consultative mechanisms to seek quick 
resolution of such detentions. 
Issues Specific to Mexico 
Mexico has stated that it would consider modernizing NAFTA, but it is not clear how this would 
take place. Mexican government officials have alluded that Mexico may seek to broaden NAFTA 
negotiations to include bilateral or trilateral cooperation on various issues, especially security and 
immigration.104 In January 2017, tensions developed between the two countries due to concerns 
about U.S. policies toward Mexico and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto canceled an 
upcoming meeting with President Trump.105 President Trump has stated that he would seek to 
impose tariffs on imports from Mexico. Mexico responded that it would retaliate “immediately” if 
the United States increases tariffs on Mexican products. President Enrique Peña Nieto has 
commented that Mexico is willing to discuss NAFTA but only under the premise that all parties 
have mutual respect for the national sovereignty of each nation.106 His Administration has also 
declared that Mexico may consider withdrawing from NAFTA if negotiations are not favorable to 
the country, although the priority for the Mexican government would be to improve the 
agreement rather than withdraw from it.107  
It is possible that a renegotiation of NAFTA may address trucking provisions. The 
implementation of NAFTA trucking provisions was a major trade issue between the United States 
and Mexico for many years because the United States delayed its trucking commitments under 
the agreement. NAFTA provided Mexican commercial trucks full access to four U.S.-border 
states in 1995 and full access throughout the United States in 2000. Citing safety concerns, the 
United States delayed the implementation of these provisions for many years. The two countries 
cooperated to resolve the issue over the years and engaged in numerous talks regarding safety and 
operational issues. By 2015, the trucking issue had been resolved.108 The International 
                                                 
103 The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), if fully ratified, could also affect 
trade facilitation among NAFTA parties. Ninety-eight out of a necessary 109 countries have ratified the agreement. 
104 Elizabeth Malkin, “Mexico Takes First Step Before Talks With U.S. on NAFTA,” The New York Times, February 1, 
2017. 
105 For more information, see CRS Insight IN10641, Mexican-U.S. Relations: Increased Tensions, by Clare Ribando 
Seelke and M. Angeles Villarreal. 
106 El Economista, “NAFTA Negotiations, Respect for National Sovereignty,” February 1, 2017. 
107 El Economista, “Mexico will Withdraw from NAFTA if it does not Benefit from a Renegotiation,” January 24, 
2017.  
108 For more information, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and 
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal. 
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Brotherhood of Teamsters subsequently filed a lawsuit over the implementation of the trucking 
provisions and may seek to revise NAFTA’s trucking provisions under a potential renegotiation. 
Issues Specific to Canada 
The United States and Canada have not specifically stated publicly what they may seek from each 
other in a potential NAFTA renegotiation. Some discussions may include dairy, softwood lumber 
or Buy American provisions. Canada administers a restrictive supply management system for 
dairy, poultry, and eggs, a program that was specifically excluded from NAFTA and WTO 
commitments. U.S. dairy producers may seek greater market access into Canada. Possible 
negotiations could also address trade in softwood lumber. Canadian provinces own the majority 
of the timberlands and administratively set the price of timber through a stumpage fee, a per unit 
volume fee charged for the right to harvest trees. U.S. industry asserts that the stumpage fees 
charged by the Canadian provinces are subsidized to promote employment or regional 
development, rather than based on market forces. Canada denies these practices, and maintains 
that Canada has a comparative advantage in timber production. Another issue relates to Buy 
American policies in the United States. Canada has been dissatisfied with application of these 
policies in U.S. government procurement. While Canadian firms are able to bid on a wide range 
of U.S. federal procurements through commitments made by under NAFTA and the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement, it has been excluded from “pass-through” procurements—
state-tendered contracts using federal funds. Canada maintains that many industries are North 
American in scope and rely parts and components sourced from both countries. 
North American Supply Chains 
Congress may wish to consider the effect of imposing tariffs on certain goods if NAFTA is 
renegotiated. As stated previously in this report, NAFTA was instrumental in the development of 
supply chains throughout North America, especially in the auto industry. Many North American 
automotive assembly lines and parts makers work together as one integrated production region 
from cities such as Toronto in Canada through Detroit and into numerous regions of Mexico. 
Labor intensive parts can be manufactured in Mexico, where production costs are lower, while 
more complex parts are made in the United States. According to some estimates, the entire North 
American auto industry employs more than 1.5 million people and contributes significantly to the 
U.S. economy.109 Tariffs or trade barriers have the potential of disrupting these production chains. 
Proponents contend that it would bring back a share of global production to the United States. 
Opponents argue that it could cause thousands of lost jobs in all three countries and benefit 
countries such as Germany and Japan as they would move their factories from Mexico back to 
their countries.110  
Trans-Pacific Partnership Withdrawal 
The United States, Canada, and Mexico participated in the negotiations for the proposed TPP 
among 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. On January 23, 2017, President Trump directed the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) to withdraw the United States as a signatory to the 
TPP. The acting USTR gave notification to that effect on January 30. The agreement had not 
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entered into force at the time because it requires ratification by member countries accounting for 
85% of the region’s GDP. TPP cannot enter into effect without U.S. participation. Implementing 
legislation, the vehicle for U.S. ratification, was not submitted by the President for consideration 
by Congress, in part due to the contentious debate over the agreement.111 
Congress may wish to address the implications of President Trump’s decision to withdraw from 
TPP and its consequences. Some TPP partners have announced their intention to move forward on 
a similar agreement without the United States, which may have implications for U.S. 
competitiveness in certain markets. Canada and Mexico have numerous FTAs with other 
countries and may continue to seek to diversify trade through FTAs. Mexico’s Economy Minister 
stated that Mexico is willing to negotiate a new agreement with the Asia-Pacific region that may 
be similar to TPP and include China in the discussions.112 The government of Chile also 
announced that it would continue to pursue trade deals with the Asia-Pacific region and has 
invited ministers from other TPP countries, as well as China and South Korea, to a summit in 
Chile in March to discuss how to proceed. Numerous countries are expected to attend.113 
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Appendix. U.S. Merchandise Trade with 
NAFTA Partners 
Table A-1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with NAFTA Partners 
(billions of nominal dollars) 
 Canada Mexico Total NAFTA  
Year Exports Imports 
Trade 
Balance Exports Imports 
Trade 
Balance Exports Imports 
Trade 
Balance 
1993 100.4 111.2 -10.8 41.6 39.9 1.7 142.0 151.1 -9.1 
1994 114.4 128.4 -14.0 50.8 49.5 1.3 165.3 177.9 -12.6 
1995 127.2 144.4 -17.1 46.3 62.1 -15.8 173.5 206.5 -33.0 
1996 134.2 155.9 -21.7 56.8 74.3 -17.5 191.0 230.2 -39.2 
1997 151.8 167.2 -15.5 71.4 85.9 -14.5 223.2 253.2 -30.0 
1998 156.6 173.3 -16.7 78.8 94.6 -15.9 235.4 267.9 -32.5 
1999 166.6 198.7 -32.1 86.9 109.7 -22.8 253.5 308.4 -54.9 
2000 178.9 230.8 -51.9 111.3 135.9 -24.6 290.3 366.8 -76.5 
2001 163.4 216.3 -52.8 101.3 131.3 -30.0 264.7 347.6 -82.9 
2002 160.9 209.1 -48.2 97.5 134.6 -37.1 258.4 343.7 -85.3 
2003 169.9 221.6 -51.7 97.4 138.1 -40.6 267.3 359.7 -92.3 
2004 189.9 256.4 -66.5 110.7 155.9 -45.2 300.6 412.3 -111.7 
2005 211.9 290.4 -78.5 120.2 170.1 -49.9 332.1 460.5 -128.3 
2006 230.7 302.4 -71.8 133.7 198.3 -64.5 364.4 500.7 -136.3 
2007 248.9 317.1 -68.2 135.9 210.7 -74.8 384.8 527.8 -143.0 
2008 261.1 339.5 -78.3 151.2 215.9 -64.7 412.4 555.4 -143.1 
2009 204.7 226.2 -21.6 128.9 176.7 -47.8 333.6 402.9 -69.4 
2010 249.3 277.6 -28.4 163.7 230.0 -66.3 412.9 507.6 -94.7 
2011 281.3 315.3 -34.0 198.3 262.9 -64.6 479.6 578.2 -98.6 
2012 292.7 324.3 -31.6 215.9 277.6 -61.7 508.5 601.9 -93.3 
2013 300.8 332.5 -31.7 226.0 280.6 -54.6 526.7 613.1 -86.4 
2014 312.8 349.3 -36.5 240.3 295.7 -55.4 553.1 645.0 -91.9 
2015 280.6 296.2 -15.5 235.7 296.4 -60.7 516.4 592.6 -76.2 
2016 266.8 278.1 -11.2 231.0 294.2 -63.2 497.8 572.2 -74.4 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
balance/country.xlsx (data accessed Feb. 8, 2017.) 
Notes: The data for U.S. exports to Canada are derived from import data compiled by Canada. The use of 
Canada’s import data to produce U.S. export data requires several alignments in order to compare the two 
series. The aggregate U. S. export figure is slightly larger. U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S./Canada Data Exchange and 
Substitution,” https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/reference/guides/tradestatsinfo.html#canada. 
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Table A-2. U.S. Private Services Trade with NAFTA Partners 
(billions of nominal dollars) 
 Canada Mexico Total NAFTA  
Year Exports Imports 
Services 
Trade 
Balance Exports Imports 
Services 
Trade 
Balance Exports Imports 
Services 
Trade 
Balance 
1993 17.0 9.1 7.9 10.4 7.4 3.0 27.4 16.5 10.9 
1994 17.2 9.9 7.3 11.3 7.9 3.4 28.5 17.8 10.7 
1995 17.9 11.0 6.9 8.7 7.9 0.8 26.6 18.9 7.7 
1996 19.5 12.4 7.1 9.4 8.9 0.5 28.9 21.3 7.6 
1997 20.5 13.7 6.8 10.8 9.9 0.9 31.3 23.6 7.7 
1998 19.4 15.0 4.4 11.7 9.8 1.9 31.1 24.8 6.3 
1999 22.9 16.6 6.3 14.2 9.7 4.5 37.1 26.3 10.8 
2000 24.8 18.2 6.6 15.8 11.2 4.6 40.6 29.4 11.2 
2001 24.7 17.8 6.9 16.7 10.9 5.8 41.4 28.7 12.7 
2002 25.2 18.4 6.8 17.9 12.3 5.6 43.1 30.7 12.4 
2003 27.6 20.0 7.6 18.5 12.5 6.0 46.1 32.5 13.6 
2004 29.5 21.2 8.3 19.5 13.9 5.6 49.0 35.1 13.9 
2005 32.8 22.6 10.2 22.5 14.4 8.1 55.3 37.0 18.3 
2006 37.9 23.9 14.0 23.8 14.9 8.9 61.7 38.8 22.9 
2007 42.7 25.7 17.0 25.0 15.3 9.7 67.7 41.0 26.7 
2008 45.4 26.0 19.4 26.2 15.9 10.3 71.6 41.9 29.7 
2009 43.5 23.7 19.8 22.9 14.0 8.9 66.4 37.7 28.7 
2010 53.1 27.4 25.7 24.6 14.0 10.6 77.7 41.4 36.3 
2011 58.3 30.5 27.8 26.4 14.7 11.7 84.7 45.2 39.5 
2012 61.9 31.1 30.8 28.2 15.4 12.8 90.1 46.5 43.6 
2013 62.9 30.8 32.1 29.9 17.3 12.6 92.8 48.1 44.7 
2014 62.0 30.3 31.7 30.2 19.9 10.3 92.2 50.2 42.0 
2015 56.4 29.0 27.4 31.5 21.9 9.6 87.9 50.9 37.0 
Source: Compiled by CRS using most recent data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis online database at 
http://www.bea.gov. 
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Table A-3. U.S. Trade with NAFTA Partners by Major Product Category: 2016 
(billions of nominal dollars) 
 U.S. Exports U.S. Imports 
NAFTA 
Partner Leading Items (NAIC 4-digit level) Value Leading Items (NAIC 4-digit level) Value 
Canada Motor Vehicles 25.9 Motor Vehicles 46.3 
 Motor Vehicle Parts 21.0 Oil & Gas 43.2 
 Petroleum & Coal Products 8.9 Motor Vehicle Parts 13.8 
 
Computer Equipment 7.8 
Nonferrous (exc Alum) & 
Processing 9.4 
 Other General Purpose Machinery 7.8 Aerospace Products & Parts 8.7 
 All Other 194.6 All Other 156.8 
 All Commodities 266.0 All Commodities 278.1 
Mexico Motor Vehicle Parts 19.8 Motor Vehicles 49.3 
 Petroleum & Coal Products 16.7 Motor Vehicle Parts 46.0 
 Computer Equipment 16.5 Computer Equipment 18.2 
 Semiconductors & Other Electronic 
Components 
12.0 Communications Equipment 14.5 
 Electrical Equipment & 
Components, Nesoi 
8.4 Audio & Video Equipment 12.5 
 All Other 157.5 All Other 153.6 
 Total exports to Mexico 231.0 Total Imports from Mexico 294.2 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the U.S. Census Bureau: Economic Indicators Division USA 
Trade Online.  
Notes: The North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) is the standard used by federal statistical 
agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical 
data related to the U.S. business economy. In addition, the data for U.S. exports to Canada are derived from 
import data compiled by Canada. The use of Canada’s import data to produce U.S. export data requires several 
alignments in order to compare the two series. The aggregate U. S. export figure is slightly larger.” U.S. Census 
Bureau, “U.S./Canada Data Exchange and Substitution,” https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/reference/guides/
tradestatsinfo.html#canada. 
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Table A-4. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment Positions with Canada and Mexico 
(1993-2015 historical cost basis [millions of dollars]) 
Year 
Canadian FDI 
in the U.S. 
U.S. FDI in 
Canada 
Mexican FDI 
in the U.S. 
U.S. FDI in 
Mexico 
1993 40,373 69,922 1,244 15,221 
1994 41,219 74,221 2,069 16,968 
1995 45,618 83,498 1,850 16,873 
1996 54,836 89,592 1,641 19,351 
1997 65,175 96,626 3,100 24,050 
1998 72,696 98,200 2,055 26,657 
1999 90,559 119,590 1,999 37,151 
2000 114,309 132,472 7,462 39,352 
2001 92,420 152,601 6,645 52,544 
2002 92,529 166,473 7,829 56,303 
2003 95,707 187,953 9,022 56,851 
2004 125,276 214,931 7,592 63,384 
2005 165,667 231,836 3,595 73,687 
2006 165,281 205,134 5,310 82,965 
2007 201,924 250,642 8,478 91,046 
2008 168,746 246,483 8,420 87,443 
2009 188,943 274,807 11,111 84,047 
2010 192,463 295,206 10,970 85,751 
2011 205,225 330,041 12,500 85,599 
2012 214,314 366,709 12,751 104,388 
2013 222,989 370,259 15,869 86,433 
2014 257,142 358,452 16,567 89,650 
2015 268,972 352,928 16,597 92,812 
Source: Compiled by CRS using most recent data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis online database at 
http://www.bea.gov. 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
 
Congressional Research Service 38 
Author Contact Information 
 
M. Angeles Villarreal 
Specialist in International Trade and Finance 
avillarreal@crs.loc.gov, 7-0321 
 Ian F. Fergusson 
Specialist in International Trade and Finance 
ifergusson@crs.loc.gov, 7-4997 
 
Acknowledgments 
Keigh E. Hammond, Research Librarian, and Amber Hope Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist, 
contributed to this report.  
